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Abstract—Can engineering neural networks be approached
in a disciplined way similar to how engineers build software
for civil aircraft? We present nn-dependability-kit, an open-
source toolbox to support safety engineering of neural networks
for autonomous driving systems. The rationale behind nn-
dependability-kit is to consider a structured approach (via Goal
Structuring Notation) to argue the quality of neural networks. In
particular, the tool realizes recent scientific results including (a)
novel dependability metrics for indicating sufficient elimination of
uncertainties in the product life cycle, (b) formal reasoning engine
for ensuring that the generalization does not lead to undesired
behaviors, and (c) runtime monitoring for reasoning whether a
decision of a neural network in operation is supported by prior
similarities in the training data. A proprietary version of nn-
dependability-kit has been used to improve the quality of a
level-3 autonomous driving component developed by Audi for
highway maneuvers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, neural networks have been widely adopted
in engineering automated driving systems with examples in
perception, decision making, or even end-to-end scenarios. As
these systems are safety-critical in nature, problems during
operation such as failed identification of pedestrians may
contribute to risky behaviors. Importantly, the root cause of
these undesired behaviors can be independent of hardware
faults or software programming errors but can solely reside in
the data-driven engineering process, e.g., unexpected results
of function extrapolation between correctly classified training
data.
In this paper, we present nn-dependability-kit, an open-
source toolbox to support data-driven engineering of neural
networks for safety-critical domains. The goal is to provide
evidence of uncertainty reduction in key phases of the product
life cycle, ranging from data collection, training & validation,
testing & generalization, to operation. nn-dependability-kit
is built upon our previous research work [2]–[6], where (a)
novel dependability metrics [3], [5] are introduced to indicate
uncertainties being reduced in the engineering life cycle, (b)
formal reasoning engine [2], [6] is used to ensure that the
generalization does not lead to undesired behaviors, and (c)
runtime neuron activation pattern monitoring [4] is applied to
reason whether a decision of a neural network in operation
time is supported by prior similarities in the training data.
Concerning related work, our results [2]–[6] are within re-
cent research efforts from the software engineering and formal
methods community targeting to provide provable guarantee
over neural networks [6], [9]–[11], [15], [17], [20], [27], [29],
[36], [37] or to test neural networks [3], [12], [16], [22],
[25], [26], [32], [33]. The static analysis engine inside nn-
dependability-kit for formally analyzing neural networks, as
introduced in our work in 2017 [6] as a pre-processing step
before exact constraint solving, has been further extended
to support the octagon abstract domain [24] in addition to
using the interval domain. One deficiency of the above-
mentioned works is how to connect safety goals or uncertainty
identification [14], [19], [30] to concrete evidences required
in the safety engineering process. This gap is tightened by
our earlier work of dependability metrics [5] being partly
integrated inside nn-dependability-kit. Lastly, our runtime
monitoring technique [4] is different from known results that
either use additional semantic embedding (and integrate it in
the loss function) for computing difference measures [23] or
use Monte-Carlo dropout [13] as ensembles: our approach
provides a sound guarantee of the similarity measure based
on the neuron word distance to the training data.
In terms of practicality, a proprietary version of nn-
dependability-kit has been successfully used to understand
the quality of a level-3 autonomous highway maneuvering
component developed by Audi.
II. FEATURES AND CONNECTIONS TO SAFETY CASES
Figure 1 provides a simplified Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN) [18] diagram to assist in understanding how features
provided by nn-dependability-kit contribute to the overall
safety goal1. Our proposed metrics, unless explicitly specified,
are based on extensions of our early work [5]. Starting with
the goal of having a neural network to function correctly (G1),
based on assumptions where no software and hardware fault
appears (A1, A2), the strategy (S1) is to ensure that within
different phases of the product life cycle, correctness is en-
sured. These phases include data preparation (G2), training
and validation (G3), testing and generalization (G4), and
operation (G5).
(Data preparation) Data preparation includes data collection
and labeling. Apart from correctly labeling the data (G6),
1Note that the GSN in Figure 1 may not be complete, but it can serve as
a basis for further extensions.
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Fig. 1: Using a simplified GSN to understand solutions (Sn) provided by nn-dependability-kit, including the associated
goals (G), assumptions (A) and strategies (S).
one needs to ensure that the collected data covers all op-
erating scenarios (G7). An artificial example of violating
such a principle is to only collect data in sunny weather,
while the vehicle is also expected to be operated in snowy
weather. Quantitative projection coverage metric [3] and
its associated test case generation techniques (Sn1, Sn2),
based on the concept of combinatorial testing [7], [21],
are used to provide a relative form of completeness
against the combinatorial explosion of scenarios.
(Training and validation) Currently, the goal of training cor-
rectness is refined into two subgoals of understanding
the decision of the neural network (G10) and correctness
rate (G8), which is further refined by considering the
performance under different operating scenarios (G9).
Under the assumption where the neural network is used
for vision-based object detection (A5), metrics such as
interpretation precision (Sn5) and sensitivity of occlu-
sion (Sn6) are provided by nn-dependability-kit.
(Testing and generalization) Apart from classical perfor-
mance measures (Sn7), we also test the generalization
subject to known perturbations such as haze or Gaussian
noise (G11) using the perturbation loss metric (Sn8).
Provided that domain knowledge can be formally spec-
ified (A3), one can also apply formal verification (Sn9)
to examine if the neural network demonstrates correct
behavior with respect to the specification (G12).
(Operation) In operation time, as the ground truth is no
longer available, a dependable system shall raise warnings
when a decision of the neural network is not supported
by prior similarities in training (S3). nn-dependability-
Fig. 2: Photos of the same location (near Munich Schwabing) with variations in terms of lighting conditions (day, night), road
surface situations (dry, wet), currently located lanes (inner, outer), and weather conditions (sunny, cloudy, rainy).
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the target vehicle selection pipeline for ACC. The input features of the Target vehicle selection NN are
defined as follows: 1-8 (possibly up to 10) are bounding boxes of detected vehicles, E is an empty input slot, i.e., there are
less than ten vehicles, and L stands for the ego-lane information.
kit provides runtime monitoring (Sn10) [4] by first using
binary decision diagrams (BDD) [1] to record binarized
neuron activation patterns in training time, followed by
checking if an activation pattern produced during opera-
tion is contained in the BDD.
III. USING NN-DEPENDABILITY-KIT
In this section, we highlight the usage of nn-dependability-
kit with three examples; interested readers can download these
examples as jupyter notebooks from the tool website.
a) Systematic data collection for training and testing:
The first example is related to the completeness of the
data used in testing autonomous driving components. The
background is that one wishes to establish a coverage-driven
data collection process where data diversity is approached
in a disciplined manner. This is in contrast to unsystematic
approaches such as merely driving as many kilometers as
possible; the visited scenarios under unsystematic approaches
may be highly repetitive.
Here for simplicity, we only consider five discrete categories
to evaluate the diversity of the collected data.
weather C1 = {cloudy, rainy, sunny}
day C2 = {day, night}
vehicle current lane C3 = {inner, outer}
curvature C4 = {straight, left bending, right bending}
surface type C5 = {dry,wet}
With discrete categorization, images or videos sharing the
same semantic attributes fall into the same equivalence class.
It is immediate that the number of equivalence classes is
exponential to number of discrete categories (in this example,
the number of equivalence classes equals 3×2×2×3×2 = 72).
Figure 2 provides 6 images taken from the German A9 high-
way (near Munich Schwabing); each of them is an instance of
a particular equivalence class. With 6 images, the coverage by
considering covering every equivalence class with one image
or video is only 672 = 8.3%. For pragmatic situations, the
number of discrete categories can easily reach 40, making the
minimum number of test cases to achieve full coverage be
thousands of billions (240).
In nn-dependability-kit, the scenario k-projection coverage
tries to create a rational yet relatively complete coverage cri-
teria that avoids the above mentioned combinatorial explosion
(rational - possible to achieve 100%) while still guaranteeing
diversity of test data (relatively complete). For example, when
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Fig. 4: Using nn-dependability-kit to perturb the image of a traffic sign (a) and compute the maximum and average performance
drop, by applying perturbation on the data set (b).
setting k = 2, the 2-projection coverage claims 100% coverage
so long as the collected data is able to cover arbitrary pairs
of conditions from two different categories. In this example,
the collected data should cover every pair (ci, cj) where
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, i 6= j, ci ∈ Ci and cj ∈ Cj . This makes
the number of test cases to achieve full coverage be quadratic
(when k = 2) to the number of categories.
nn-dependability-kit reports that a data set using 6 im-
ages in Figure 2 achieves a 2-projection coverage of 3257 .
In addition, the solver automatically suggests to include
(cloudy, night, inner, right bending, dry) as the next image or
video to be collected; the suggested case can maximally
increase the coverage by 757 . The denominator 57 comes from
the following computation
∑
i<j,i,j∈{1,2,3,4,5} |Ci|×|Cj |. One
may additionally include constraints to describe unreasonable
cases that cannot be found in reality. For example, constraints
such as 0 ≤ C1.sunny + C2.night ≤ 1 prohibits the solver
to consider proposals where the image is taken at night
(C2.night = 1) but the weather is sunny (C1.sunny = 1).
b) Formal verification of a highway front car selection
network: The second example is to formally verify properties
of a neural network that selects the target vehicle for an
adaptive cruise control (ACC) system to follow. The overall
pipeline is illustrated in Figure 3, where two modules use
images of a front facing camera of a vehicle to (i) detect other
vehicles as bounding boxes (vehicle detection via YOLO [28])
and (ii) identify the ego-lane boundaries (ego-lane detection).
Outputs of these two modules are fed into the third module
called target vehicle selection, which is as a neural-network
based classifier that reports either the index of the bounding
box where the target vehicle is located, or a special class for
“no target vehicle”.
As the target vehicle selection neural network takes a fixed
number of bounding boxes, one undesired situation of the
neural network appears when the network outputs the existence
of a target vehicle with index i, but the corresponding i-
th input does not contain a vehicle bounding box (marked
with “E” in Figure 3). For the snapshot in Figure 3, the
neural network should not output box 9 or 10 as there are
only 8 vehicle bounding boxes. The below code snippet shows
how to verify if the unwanted behavior happens in a neural
network (net). The undesired property is encoded into two
sets of linear constraints, the inputConstraints denotes
box 9 and 10 do not exist and the riskProperty denotes
the neural network selects box 9 or 10 as the final result.
The verify() function verifies whether if there exists an input
that is contained in the specified minimum and maximum
bound (inputMinBound, inputMaxBound) while satisfy-
ing inputConstraints, but feeding the input to the neural
network produces an output that satisfies riskProperty.
import staticanalysis as sa
...
sa.verify(inputMinBound, inputMaxBound,
net, inputConstraints, riskProperty)
c) Perturbation Loss over German Traffic Sign Recog-
nition Network: The last example is to analyze a neural
network trained under the German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmark [31] with the goal of classifying various traffic
signs. With nn-dependability-kit, one can apply the pertur-
bation loss metric using the below code snippet, in order to
understand the robustness of the network subject to known
perturbations.
import PerturbationLoss as pbl
m = pbl.Perturbation_Loss_Metric()
...
m.addInputs(net, image, label)
...
m.printMetricQuantity("AVERAGE_LOSS")
As shown in the center of Figure 4-a, the original im-
age of “end of no overtaking zone” is perturbed by nn-
dependability-kit using seven methods. The application of
Gaussian noise changes the result of classification, where
the confidence of being “end of no overtaking zone” has
dropped 83.4% (from the originally identified 100% to 16.6%).
When applying perturbation systematically over the complete
data set, the result is summarized in Figure 4-b, where one
concludes that the network is robust against haze and fog (the
maximum probability reduction is close to 0%) but should be
improved against FGSM attacks [34] and snow.
IV. OUTLOOK
The journey of nn-dependability-kit originates from an
urgent need in creating a rigorous approach for engineering
learning-enabled autonomous driving systems. We conclude
this paper by highlighting some of our ongoing activities:
(i) Transfer the developed safety concept to standardization
communities. (ii) Investigate how assume-guarantee reasoning
techniques can make formal verification scalable. (iii) Extend
recent results in safe perturbation bounds [8], [35], [37], [38]
to support decisions beyond classification.
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